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Paul Karl Feyerabend (January 13, 1924 - February 11, 1994) was an Austrian-born philosopher of science, who later lived in England, the United States, New Zealand, Switzerland and Italy. His major works include Against Method (published in 1975), Science in a Free Society (published in 1978) and Farewell to Reason (a collection of papers published in 1987). Feyerabend became famous because of his extremely relativistic view of science and his rejection of the existence of universal methodological rules.
Paul Feyerabend was born in 1924 in Vienna. He also attended primary school and high school in this city. In this period he got into the habit of reading a lot, developed an interest in theatre, and started singing lessons. When he graduated from high school in April 1942, he was drafted into the German Arbeitsdienst. After basic training in Pirmasens, (Germany), he was assigned to a unit in Quelerne en Bas, (France). Feyerabend described the work he did during that period as monotonous: "we moved around in the countryside, dug ditches, and filled them up again." After a short leave, he joined the army and volunteered for officer school. In his autobiography, he wrote that he hoped the war would be over by the time he had finished his education as an officer. This turned out not to be the case. From December 1943 on, he served as an officer on the northern part of the Eastern Front, was decorated with an Iron cross, and attained the rank of lieutenant. After the German army started its retreat from the advancing Red army, Feyerabend was hit by three bullets while directing traffic. It turned out that one of the bullets had hit him in the spine. As a consequence of this, he needed to walk with a stick for the rest of his life and frequently experienced severe pains. He spent the rest of the war recovering from his injuries.
When the war was over, Feyerabend first got a temporary job in Apolda in which he wrote pieces of theatre. After that, he took various classes at the Weimar Academy, and returned to Vienna to study History and Sociology. He got dissatisfied however, and soon transferred to Physics, where he met Felix Ehrenhaft, a physicist whose experiments would influence his later views on the nature of science. Feyerabend changed the subject of his study to philosophy and submitted his final thesis on observation sentences. In his autobiography, he described his philosophical views during this time as "staunchly empiricist". In 1948 he visited the first meeting of the international summer seminar of the Austrian College Society in Alpbach. This was the place where Feyerabend first met Karl Popper, who had a large influence on his later works, first in a positive, but later in a negative way. In 1951, Feyerabend was granted a British Council scholarship to study under Wittgenstein. However, Wittgenstein died before Feyerabend moved to England. Feyerabend then chose Popper as his supervisor instead, and went to study at the London School of Economics in 1952. In his autobiography, Feyerabend explains that during this time, he was influenced much by Popper: "I had fallen for [Popper's ideas]". After that, Feyerabend returned to Vienna and was involved in various projects. He wrote a German translation of Karl Popper's Open Society and its Enemies, a report on the development of the humanities in Austria and several articles for an encyclopedia.
In 1955, Feyerabend received his first academic appointment at the University of Bristol, England, where he gave lectures about the Philosophy of science. Later in his life he worked as a lecturer in Berkeley, Auckland, Sussex, Yale, London and Berlin. During this time, he developed a critical view of science, which he later described as 'anarchistic' or 'dadaistic' to illustrate his rejection of the dogmatic use of rules. This position was incompatible with the contemporary rationalistic culture in the philosophy of science. At the London School of Economics, Feyerabend met another student of Popper, Imre Lakatos. They planned to write a dialogue volume, to be titled For and Against Method, in which Lakatos would defend a rationalist view of science and Feyerabend would attack it. Lakatos' sudden death put an end to this planned joint publication. Despite this, Feyerabend wrote the critique, which is a mainly a collage of articles that he wrote earlier. Against method became a famous criticism of current philosophical views of science and provoked many reactions. One reason for this may be that Feyerabend enjoyed using inflammatory and direct language. There is passion and energy in his writings unequaled by other philosophers of science. In his autobiography, he reveals that this came at great cost to himself. Following the initial reviews of Against Method, which were overwhelmingly negative, he fell into a deep depression.
Despite this, Feyerabend continued to defend his controversial philosophical position. He lectured in Berkeley and later on also in Kassel and Zurich. After his retirement, Feyerabend kept publishing a large amount of papers and worked on his autobiography. He died in 1994 of the consequences of a brain tumor.
Feyerabend?s critique of science takes place on two fronts. Having been influenced by Popper, he examines in detail the logic of scientific method, as well as making a detailed, if unconventional, study of key episodes in the history of science.
Feyerabend argued that adherence to any strict method, such as those presented by Lakatos or Popper, would in the long run be counterproductive for the progress of science. All such methods place unhelpful restrictions in the path of progress.
Feyerabend points out that to insist that new theories be consistent with old theories gives an unreasonable advantage to the older theory. He makes the logical point that being compatible with a defunct older theory does not increase the validity or truth of a new theory over an alternative covering the same content. That is, if one had to choose between two theories of equal explanatory power, to choose the one that is compatible with an older, falsified theory is to make an aesthetic, rather than a rational choice. The familiarity of such a theory might also make it more appealing to scientists, since they will not have to disregard as many cherished prejudices. Hence, that theory can be said to have ?an unfair advantage?.
Feyerabend also argues that no interesting theory is ever consistent with all the relevant facts. He uses several examples, but ?renormalization? in quantum mechanics provides an example of his intentionally provocative style: ?This procedure consists in crossing out the results of certain calculations and replacing them by a description of what is actually observed. Thus one admits, implicitly, that the theory is in trouble while formulating it in a manner suggesting that a new principle has been discovered? (AM p. 61). Such jokes are not intended as a criticism of the practice of scientists. Feyerabend is not advocating that physicists not make use of renormalization or other ad hoc methods ? quite the opposite. He is arguing that they are essential to the progress of science. Feyerabend?s dispute is with methodologies that hide this fact.
Together these remarks sanction the introduction of theories that are inconsistent with well-established facts. Furthermore, a pluralistic methodology that involves making comparisons between any theories at all forces defendants to improve the articulation of each theory. Thus Feyerabend proposes that science might proceed best not by induction, but by counterinduction.
Feyerabend examines in detail crucial events in the history of science, arguing that they provide examples of counterinduction at work. For instance, from the point of view of an Aristotelian, that a ball dropped from a tower lands directly under the point from which it was dropped, and not to one side or the other, is a falsification of the hypothesis that the earth moves. Feyerabend argues that in order to progress beyond Aristotelianism, Galileo had to make use of ad hoc hypothesis and alterations to the very language in which observations are made. For Feyerabend, Galileo proceeds counterinductively, and against the rational principles of scientific method.
Feyerabend objected to any single prescriptive scientific method on the grounds that any such method would limit the activities of scientists, and hence restrict scientific progress. New theories came to be accepted not because of their accord with scientific method, but because their supporters made use of any trick – rational, rhetorical or ribald – in order to advance their cause. Without a fixed ideology, or the introduction of religious tendencies, the only approach which does not inhibit progress (using whichever definition of progress you see fit) is "anything goes": "'anything goes' is not a 'principle' I hold... but the terrified exclamation of a rationalist who takes a closer look at history." (Feyerabend, 1975).
Feyerabend described science as being essentially anarchistic, of being obsessed with its own mythology, and of making claims to truth well beyond its actual capacity. He called for a separation of the state and science for much the same reasons that are used to justify the separation of state and church.
In his last book, unfinished when he died, he talks of how our sense of reality is shaped and limited. Conquest of Abundance: A Tale of Abstraction versus the Richness of Being bemoans the propensity we have of institutionalizing these limitations.
Major works:
Collected papers:
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