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In philosophy, epistemic theories of truth are attempts to analyse the notion of truth in terms of epistemic notions such as "belief", "acceptance", "verification", "justification", "perspective" and so on.
There is a variety of such conceptions, and they may be classified into two basic kinds:
Verificationism is based on the idea that the mind engages in a certain kind of activity: "verifying" a proposition. The distinctive claim of verificationism is that the result of such verifications is, by definition, truth. That is, truth is reducible to this process of verification.
According to perspectivalism (or relativism), a proposition is only ever true relative to a perspective. Roughly, a proposition is true relative to a perspective if, and only if, it is "accepted" or "endorsed" or "legitimated" somehow by that perspective.
Verificationism about truth comes in three main kinds:
The process of verification involves the comparison of a statement with sensory experience. On this account, a proposition is true if, and only if, it is verifable by sensory experience.
The process of verification is a purely a priori process. Verification here involves a priori reflection, and results in an a priori determination of the truth value of a proposition. On this account, a proposition is true if, and only if, it is verifable by a priori reasoning. A related view is the certainty theory, associated with Descartes and Spinoza: A proposition is true if and only if it is certain, or it is known with certainty.
A proposition is true if, and only if it is useful to believe.
Positivism may seem attractive to someone who thinks that all knowledge is grounded in observation and sensory experience. A priorism may seem attractive as an account of truth for the domains of logic and mathematics. The logical positivists of the Vienna Circle (Rudolf Carnap, Otto Neurath, et al.) attempted to combine positivism with a version of a priorism. Roughly, statements are divided in to those which are analytic (and thus can be see to be true a priori) and those which are synthetic (which can be verified by sensory experience).
The pragmatist view of truth is associated with the American philosophers, William James and John Dewey.
Turning to perspectivalism (relativism), a proposition is only ever true relative to something like a perspective. There are four main versions of perspectivalism, and some interesting subdivisions:
Perspectives are the points of view of particular individual persons. So, a proposition is true for a person if and only if it is accepted or believed by that person (i.e., "true for me").
A perspective is simply any system of discourse, and it is a matter of convention which one chooses. A proposition is true relative to that particular discourse if and only if it is somehow produced ("legitimated") by the methods of that particular discourse. An example of this appears in the philosophy of mathematics: formalism. A proposition is true relative to a set of assumptions just in case it is a deductive consequence of those assumptions.
Collectivist Perspectivalism: Perspectives are understood as collectivities of people (cultures, traditions, etc.). There are, roughly, three versions of collectivism:
A perspective is, roughly, the broad opinions, and perhaps norms and practices, of a community of people, perhaps all having some special feature in common. So, a proposition is true (for a community C) if, and only if, there is a consensus amongst the members of C for believing it.
On this view, a perspective is a collectivity enforced by power, authority, military might, privilege, etc. So, a proposition is true if it "makes us powerful" or is "produced by power". This view of truth is associated with Heidegger, Michel Foucault, and some social constructivists. The fascist conception of truth is summed up with the slogan that "truth is power".
Truth-generating perspectives are collectives opposed to, or engaged in struggle against, power and authority. For example, the collective perspective of the "proletariat". So, proposition is true if it is the "product of political struggle" for the "emancipation of the workers" (Adorno). This view is again associated with some social constructivists (e.g., feminist epistemologists).
On this conception, a truth-conferring perspective is something transcendental, and outside immediate human reach. The idea is that there is a transcendental or ideal epistemic perspective and truth is, roughly, what is accepted or recognized-as-true from that ideal perspective. There are three subvarieties of transcendental perspectivalism:
The ideal epistemic perspective is the set of "maximally coherent and consistent propositions". A proposition is true if and only if it is a member of this maximally coherent and consistent set of propositions (associated with several German and British 19th century idealists).
The ideal epistemic perspective is that of God ("God's point of view"). A proposition is true if, and only if, it agrees with the thoughts of God.
The ideal epistemic perspective is that of "C. S. Peirce. A less scientistic version of this view is associated with Jurgen Habermas.
To summarize, the major epistemic theories of truth are:
V1. Positivism
V2. A Priorism
V3. Pragmatism
P1. Individual Perspectivalism ("true for me")
P2. Discourse Perspectivalism (Conventionalism)
P3. Collectivist Perspectivalism
P4. Transcendental Perspectivalism
Many authors writing on the topic of the notion of truth often advocate or endorse complicated mixtures of these positions. Each of these epistemic conceptions of truth can be subjected to various criticisms. Some criticisms apply across the board, while others are more specific.
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