Earliest Buddhism
We do not have a great deal of information about earliest Buddhism, the form of the religion predating its later codification in the established canons and practices of the Early Buddhist schools and later innovations like the Mahāyāna.
Some texts, however, have been identified by scholars as being earlier than others; for example, in the Sutta Nipāta, which is a branch of the Khuddhaka Nikāya of the Sutta Piṭaka in the Tipitaka, there are two texts, the Aṭṭhakavagga (hereafter Attha) and Pārāyanavagga (hereafter Para), which scholars regard as being considerably earlier in composition than the bulk of the canon, and which reveal an earlier form of the religion.1 They are regarded as earlier because of elements of language and composition, their inclusion in very early commentaries, and also because they seem to express versions of certain Buddhist beliefs that are different from, and perhaps prior to, their later codified versions.2 The Khaggavisānasutta (Rhinoceros Sutra), also in the Sutta Nipāta, similarly seems to reveal an earlier mode of Buddhist monasticism, which emphasized individual wandering monastics, more in keeping with the Indian sannyāsin tradition. A relatively complete version of the Rhinoceros Sutra was included in the group of texts discovered in Gandhara in 1994, which are the earliest Indian manuscripts discovered; textual material from the Attha and Para was also represented in the Gandhara find.
Speaking generally, the Attha and Para tend more strongly to emphasize the negatative sides of asceticism (i.e., asceticism as a process of negating desire), and show a strong concern with regulating everyday bodily activities and sexual desires. They also place considerable emphasis on the rejection of all views, and are reluctant to put forward positions of their own regarding basic metaphysical issues. This has caused some commentators to compare them to later Madhyamaka philosophy, which in its Prasaṅgika form especially makes a method of rejecting others views rather than proposing its own.
The Attha and Para also differ in their articulation of Buddhist meditation practices, leaning heavily on what would come to be defined as samatha and showing very little evidence of vipassanā at all, despite the important role played by the balance of these two elements in later Buddhism. This seems to be connected to the rejection of views, for if there is no correct view to gain insight into, meditation would be conceived simply as the practice of cultivating a mental state devoid of views.
Thus the ultimate meditative object expressed in these texts, "akiṅcañña", "Not-any-thing-ness" (i.e., total negation), which of course begs comparison to the Madhyamaka ideal of śūnyatā.
See also
